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Abstract
Since the start of the political and economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe,
much of the transformation was embedded in the process of leaving the Eastern alliance
and joining the Western part of Europe. This co-evolution of transition and approaching
the West showed certain patterns which, as the accession process accelerates, seem
necessary to renounce. EU accession needs transformations different from the earlier ones
in a way that they will be less autonomous, demand active government control and reliance
on bureaucracies, will be centered more on Europe, face more resistance by particular
Western countries or constituencies, and need cooperation among candidate countries.
These new patterns of introducing accession-related reforms may lead to tensions in the
candidate countries that block the accession process. In order to ease these tensions,
governments, legislative bodies, and the elites in general in the candidate countries must
make themselves and the public understand the specific features of the accession process.
In certain fields EU institutions can also smooth this development.
About the Author
János Gács is Leader of the Economic Transition and Integration Project at the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Tel: (+43-2236) 807-326, Fax:
(+43-2236) 71313 (gacs@iiasa.ac.at).
Accession to the EU: A Continuation of
or a Departure from Transition Reforms?
1
János Gács
This essay attempts to analyze two recent experiences of Central and Eastern European
countries (CEECs)2 in transition with regard to their approaching EU membership. The
first experience is that since 1989-1991, the start of the political and economic transition in
the region, much of the transformation was embedded in the process of leaving the Eastern
alliance and joining the Western part of Europe. The CEECs wanted to stop being satellites
of the Soviet empire and prisoners of the rigid Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA), and aimed at building relations with that part of the world they had been
separated from for decades. This tendency meant that establishing closer relations with
Western European institutions, business, and culture was enhanced by the transition and
vice versa.
The other experience is that, as essential EU membership negotiations approach and the
adoption of EU norms and requirements becomes pressing, the candidate countries realize
that many patterns of introduction of reforms they had followed in the first phase of
transition have to be relinquished. This implies, among others, also the way transition and
building relations with the West were intertwined in the early 1980s.
The first two parts of the study deal with these conflicting tendencies, while the third part
looks for possible ways of reconciliation. Does this conflict cause tensions? Will it lead to
a break in the transition process, and how will it affect the preparations for enlargement?
How can Eastern European governments, business, and public put up with the conflict, and
how can the EU help steering reforms in the CEECs in harmony with preparations for
accession? These are the questions I will try to answer at the end of the essay.
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 The German, edited version of this paper is to be published in the Außenwirtschaftsjahrbuch 1998/1999
of the Austrian Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs in February, 1999.
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 CEECs here mean all ten Eastern European candidate countries, if not otherwise indicated.
21. Transition and EU Integration - Processes that Strengthen
Each Other
1.1. Leave the East - join the West!
Preparation for accession to the EU in the CEECs can be viewed to a large extent as a
continuation of the transition process. Transition in the economic sphere has comprised
several interrelated processes such as stabilization, liberalization, marketization and
restructuring. Each process has been enhanced by the general turn of the transition
countries to the West, and the more specific recent process of targeting EU membership.
At the outset of transition, stabilization was the most pressing task. In most countries it
was a country-specific assignment to be carried out by national leadership, but with much
assistance from the West, especially from the international financial institutions (IFIs), and
most notably the IMF.
The interrelation between Western influence and transition was the most obvious in the
case of liberalization. Liberalization of economic activities (entry and exit to the markets),
and through this enabling competition, was strongly related to liberalization of foreign
trade and subsequently of capital flows. Trade and capital liberalizations (combined with
the demise of the CMEA and the disintegration of the Soviet Union) brought about
spectacular changes. For example, the share of exports to the EU in total exports of the
CEECs was between 6% and 52% in 1990 and increased to 39% to 66% in 1996 (the
lowest share was achieved by Bulgaria and the highest by Poland in both years)3. The
liberalization of cross-border flows of capital (the furthest progressed in Estonia, the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland) led to large inflows of foreign direct investments (FDI)
and portfolio capital from the West, and to an organic integration of business across the
borders.
In the process of marketization (including privatization) the CEECs  have usually adopted
explicit patterns devised and practiced in the West, familiar to them from Western Europe.
Restructuring was induced by many factors, among others by the competition of imports
coming from the West. The new opportunities opened in Western export markets also
played a role, particularly the markets in Western Europe which were close and were
opened faster than the rest of the world. As for the fundamental change in the behavior of
grass root business one has to emphasize the role of imitation of the forms of management,
organization, products and services coming from the West, and again particularly from
neighboring countries of the EU.
Some analysts, such as Roland (1997) put the geopolitical factor - closeness to the West -
to a prominent place, responsible for many, otherwise not easily explainable, features of
transition, such as the lack of major policy reversals in the CEECs despite the backlash by
voters in the second free elections, the breakdown of the CMEA, and the rapid
expectational changes in enterprise budget constraints that led to a shift in the behavior of
managers of state-owned enterprises.
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 See WIIW (1997). Here CEECs are all candidate countries without the Baltic countries; EU means the 15
current members of the EU (including the GDR in 1990).
31.2. Assistance
From the very beginning of the reform process the CEECs received foreign assistance. The
most generous and most diversified multilateral assistance came from the EU.4 In order to
perpetuate this assistance and transform it to a cushion that can be used in a systematic
way for their still fragile economies, the logical step for the CEECs is the establishment of
EU membership. Similar systematization of assistance was achieved by joining such IFIs
as the IMF and the World Bank.
According to the Agenda 2000 (1997) document series of the Commission and the
subsequent decisions of the Luxembourg meeting of the European Council, there will be a
gradual transformation of the EU assistance programs for the candidate countries. First,
from March 1998, the previous forms of assistance were merged to a framework of
programs called the Accession Partnership, while from the year 2000 the candidate
countries will receive aid for their agriculture and structural adjustment similar to transfers
that EU member countries get from the Cohesion Fund.
2. Previous Transition Patterns in Conflict with Accession
2.1. From autonomous reforms to changes and policies geared to
accession
Since 1989-1991, the beginning of the political and economic transition, the transition
process was basically an autonomous one. The establishment of the institutions of political
democracy, the institutions of market economy based on private property, and the bulk of
new legislation was made at autonomous national initiatives. This explains why we find in
the CEECs such a diversity of institutions in the political establishment, the government or,
for instance, in the methods and institutions used in the privatization process. The impact
of IFIs and Western advisers can not be denied either: much of the Western influence
comprised technical assistance aimed at speeding up the establishment of new institutions
and policies. Most of this Western impact, however, was kept, for political reasons, sub
rosa. After all, the CEECs were in the process of redefining themselves as independent,
neutral nation states, with much emphasis on self-determination based on their traditional
historical and cultural values.
In the most recent years it has become obvious that most of the future reforms and policies
would be geared to EU accession. Consequently, they are externally influenced, and
influenced only by one, although complex, institution, the EU. This is especially true for
those countries that already established both WTO and OECD membership (i.e. the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland): after fulfilling the membership criteria in those
organizations they can concentrate on their coming membership in the EU (and NATO).
An important event for starting to link almost all coming reforms to the EU was the
Copenhagen meeting of the European Council in 1993 which classified the criteria of EU
membership for the Eastern European applicant countries.
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 In fact, the fast changes in Eastern Europe urged the West to show guidance and support. This need for
support emphasized the EU’s role in the region, and the decisions of the 1989 G7 meeting in Paris
"catapulted" the EU into leadership (see De Benedictis and Padoan, 1993).
4For CEEC decision-making bodies it is not easy to give up the independence in decision
making that was regained after so many decades of subordination. One should admit here,
however, that the long-term strategies of these countries have already been dominated by
the goal of EU membership and the implied requirements. This is clear when one reads the
various middle- and long-term strategies and modernization programs devised in Hungary
in 1995-1996, or Slovenia’s Strategy for International Relations of 1996 (Strategy of...,
1996).
A similar tension arises also in the context of short-term policies. The still fragile
economies of the Eastern European region may experience shocks that the normal,
automatic working of these economies can not easily adjust to, or at large costs only;
consequently these shocks need urgent policy action. A recent experience of this nature has
been the sudden and grave deterioration of the trade balance in most of the CEECs in
1996-1997. Beside other policy actions the countries opted for the introduction of import
deposits, import quotas, import surcharges, or decided to change their exchange rate
regime. Many of these steps were not coherent with their commitments to the existing
association with the EU. Certainly, the policy actions in response to such shocks will be
even more limited when the CEECs assume EU membership, let alone membership in the
EMU.
The more international organizations the CEECs become members of, the narrower is the
array of discretionary policy actions their governments can autonomously and without due
consultation with these organizations choose from. After becoming (active) members of
the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO (membership of the Baltic countries still pending) and
the OECD (the three countries listed above), EU membership confines further the room for
action (especially in its post-Maastricht form, complemented by the Schengen agreement).
Even if various transfers from the EU will support the member countries in their medium-
term adjustments, there is a high chance that these new independent nations will live
through the changes as losing their long awaited autonomy.
2.2. Cutback in state bureaucracy versus a growing need for effective,
professional administration
State administration in transition countries used to be oversized. Its activity was based on
the logic of mandatory planning in a hierarchy of state administration with subordinated
state-owned enterprises, rather than on legal rules guiding the behavior of legal entities,
whether state or local government owned, non-profit organizations or private business.
Restructuring of state administration in these countries has been a formidable task which
went on with delay, hesitation, and in some countries in an improvised way. In many
successor countries of the Soviet Union the implosion of the old hierarchy (including the
control by the Communist Party) left a regulatory void that contributed greatly to the
decline in output and the general feeling of lawlessness. In the smaller CEECs the process
was not so dramatic. The reduction of state administration was necessary and it was
enhanced by the growth of private business activities that offered attractive opportunities
for the more experienced, well informed and well connected state officials and experts.
Despite numerous institutional changes in the CEECs, state administration in most of the
countries is currently characterized by the survival of remnants of the old structures and
overemployment on the one hand, and by a lack of good quality and reasonably
5remunerated experts, on the other.5 In all the countries civil service is in principle free of
political influence. The changes of governments as a consequence of democratic elections,
however, led in many countries to the regular replacement of senior or even middle-level
civil servants, which made the operation of the administrations uncertain. The Commission
Opinion (Agenda 2000, 1997) on the ten applicant countries found that in most of these
countries civil servants are badly paid, their salaries and working conditions are well below
those in the private sector (in Hungary and the Czech Republic salaries are about one third
of the salaries paid for comparable efforts in the private sector) and officials are frequently
dependent on secondary incomes.6
Preparations for EU accession negotiations, the negotiations themselves, and the
management of relations with EU institutions following accession requires substantial
addition to and improvement of the administrative capacity of state bureaucracies. This
will be a development diametric to the developments that occurred in this field in recent
years. Especially immense will be the task for small countries because many of the tasks
related to EU accession are not size dependent, i.e. the burden is the same on large and on
small countries.7
When emphasizing the need of building an efficient and professional administration, one
has to recall that the lion’s share of the changes in the transition period was related to the
dismantling of administrations and regulations. The approximation to the European Union,
necessary for membership (expressed in parameters such as the share of exports/imports
with the EU, the increase of intra-industry trade, the emergence of cross-border trade flows
and joint companies) was made possible basically by revoking zillions of earlier
regulations and not by guiding the enterprises by administrations toward approaching a
desirable structure of their activities. Most of the developments in the transition period
required reduction and even minimization of state intervention.
2.3. Unleashing spontaneous processes versus building active
government policies
Here we continue our arguments presented above, but by emphasizing the philosophy of
the management of transition rather than the scale and quality of state bureaucracy.
The core of economic transformation has been liberalization: removing the stumbling
blocks from the way of private initiatives, free entry and exit to the market, free trade, free
flow of labor and capital, free formation of prices, etc. According to János Kornai the
systemic changes started so that "as soon as [the new political structures] took over the
power, they removed the stumbling blocks from the way of the spontaneous forces of
capitalist economy" (Kornai, 1997). No doubt, this included active policies such as putting
the protection of private property into the constitution, making privatization a government
program, the legalization of distribution of capitalist ideologies, etc., but it was still the
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 The new countries are in a special position since they have to build up parts of their administration from
scratch.
6
 Exceptions are Slovakia, Slovenia and certain regions of Poland.
7
 It is not by chance that Slovenia’s official Strategy of International Economic Relations (1996) devotes its
full last chapter (entitled Prepared for the European Union) to the improvement of administrative capacities.
6creation of the necessary conditions, rather than the implementation of a grand plan. The
next steps in the transformation process were not always well planned either: there were
many improvised moves responding to emerging needs and pressures.
Contrary to these developments, preparations for EU membership need careful planning
and scheduling, coordination, institution building, as well as the adoption of ready-made
institutions, norms and rules.
2.4. Orientation toward Europe or toward the world
For numerous economic, social, and political reasons, for the CEECs an integration with
the EU is highly preferred to joining (or remaining in) other integrations, let alone creating
new ones. Many CEECs realize, however, that Europe does not present the only pattern
they should pay attention to: in the past decade Europe has not been the growth pole of the
world economy, has not been the source region of major innovations in technology, has not
made progress in improving flexibility in its labor market arrangements and social security
systems, and - except for some countries - seems to be unable to tackle the unemployment
problem.
In their relations to foreign countries many CEECs have, in recent years, made efforts to
attract non-European business to their countries. Evidence for this is the prominence of US
capital in joint ventures and foreign-owned firms in many CEECs, or the recent increase of
Asian interest in some industries, especially car manufacturing in the CEECs. Non-
European business interest in the CEECs is, in fact, consistent with future EU membership,
and is even encouraged by it (see, for example, Economic Evaluation, 1996). Special
bilateral deals between CEECs and non-EU partners, such as specific trade concessions or
the instigation of foreign investments by specific benefits are, however, bound to be
limited in the future.
While labor market rules and social benefits are not strictly regulated in the EU, there is a
tendency toward such regulation, especially if, following the establishment of the EMU,
the creation of a political union will gain momentum. Comparative unemployment
statistics at the end of 1997 (an average 10.5% unemployment in the EU, versus four
CEECs above this level and six below) indicate that the CEECs, which are just recovering
from the worst peace-time recession of the century, have no more problems with
unemployment than their thriving Western European counterparts. At their income level,
however, the CEECs can not afford the generous social security provisions and rigid labor
market regulations that the Western European countries apply. In fact, flexibility in various
respects has become the major advantage of the CEECs, which they do not want to
sacrifice. But after becoming EU members, would they not be blamed for "social
dumping" if they stick to their current labor market patterns and do not adjust to what
many see by now as outworn regulations followed in Western Europe?
2.5. Reforms, preparations and negotiations: individually or in a country
group
In recent years, countries in transition planned and managed their transformation on their
own with very little coordination among themselves. No doubt, IFIs often made attempts
to deal with them in a group, researchers do this routinely due to the benefit of
comparisons, and certain intellectual groups in transition countries frequently call for
7regionally coordinated policy actions. The political leaders of these countries, however,
keep resisting such calls, and this for various reasons. First, because they got tired of
working together in such forced companies as the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA. Second,
because these politicians have often been attached to different political lines: for instance,
in 1996-1997 the government coalitions in Hungary and Poland were dominated by
socialist (or ex-communist) parties, while the Czech government was dominated by right
wing civic parties with no intention to collaborate with any kind of ex-communists. And
third, because due to historical, ethnic or other reasons, the cooperation of these countries
was hindered by prejudices.
The field where most cooperation was achieved was trade, but even the formation of the
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the trade association currently
grouping seven CEECs, was a bit belated and came under some pressure from the
European Union.
Since EU membership negotiations are to be carried out with individual candidate
countries, the cooperation among the candidates is not obligatory. The bulk of the earlier
negotiations were also arranged bilaterally with the EU, except for the recent so-called
Structural Dialogue which, with EU organization, gave an opportunity to senior officials of
the applicant countries for multinational consultations.
EU membership negotiations make it more evident than ever before that transition
countries, pursuing their common goals, could carry out consultations for their mutual
benefit. Exchange of views, coordination of their strategies and tactics before and during
negotiations would be advantageous, since in many issues they may have common
interests, and their weight is greater if they stand up jointly. This way the use of the tactics
of divide et impera against the applicants could be prevented.
2.6. Changing Western attitudes: benevolent versus mixed
Since the beginning of the transition the CEECs were welcomed with sympathy and
support by Western governments in their efforts to change their old political and economic
systems. The support was expressed in many forms and at many levels.
Since EU membership has become a realistic goal for some of the candidate countries this
overwhelmingly supportive choir, however, has become spoiled by more and more
dissonant sounds. Interest groups, local governments and even national governments
express doubts about the advantages of the enlargement of the Union and agitate against a
hasty accession. They demand delays in some features of integration, such as the free flow
of labor, and request compensation for the losses they will incur as a consequence of
Eastern enlargement. More prominent in showing an unfriendly attitude are countries
adjacent to the transition economies (especially in view of the alleged threat of labor
migration, environmental dumping, and worsening security), and the current beneficiaries
of the union’s transfers from the structural and cohesion funds.
A striking example is Austria. From the very beginning of the transition process this
country understood the political and economic importance of transformations well, and
generously supported almost all the countries in the Central European region. Government
agencies and the Austrian National Bank provided technical assistance, Vienna hosted
many new initiatives and institutions, including the Joint Vienna Institute which provides
highly needed training for government officials in the region. The Austrian business
8community, due to its traditional historical ties to the countries in the region, boldly started
doing business from the first moment when new opportunities emerged, and has become a
prominent trade partner, a source of FDI, banking and other financial services in the
CEECs. Many studies verified that, as a consequence of this early and ambitious start,
Austrian business benefited much from the opening of Eastern Europe.
The overwhelmingly supportive attitude started to change from the end of 19968.
Especially the leadership of the regional state of Burgenland has protested regularly against
the enlargement as such, or against a too early enlargement, with vague reference to the
alleged threats to business and employment in Burgenland. This growing hysteria with
respect to the alleged dangers of enlargement started to characterize the positions taken by
the Austrian trade unions, employer associations, and occasionally the remarks of senior
officials in highest executive positions. And all these came despite the overwhelming
evidence (both in the form of statistics and scholarly analysis) that Austria enjoyed great
benefits (probably the greatest among the Western countries) from the transformation and
opening up of Eastern Europe.  (One has to admit: Austria’s approach has become
considerably more constructive following July 1998, the start of Austria’s presidency in
the EU.)
One can not deny that incumbents (including countries, regions, industries or employee
groups) can lose from enlargement, especially in the short run. The major issues have been
discussed in the literature openly and widely (see, for instance, Baldwin, 1994 and von
Hagen, 1996), particularly with regard to such topics as the budget burden, the strains on
structural funds and the Common Agricultural policy, and the challenges to existing voting
rules. What is disturbing is that after the acknowledgment of the problems by EU
institutions and the start of an enlargement process that would certainly try to take care of
the problems (c.f. the planned cap of 4% of GDP on EU transfers to new members) the
member countries have started to work on their own against a centrally coordinated
enlargement process.
The CEECs are obviously not completely lost when they face such unfriendly attitudes:
there are ways to dispute unfounded claims, they can negotiate at different levels to
disperse fears of the East. However, the hostile attitude in some EU countries toward
building stronger relations with the East is a completely new phenomenon. Eastern
European governments will have more than enough tasks to manage their countries'
convergence to the EU, as well as persuade their own public of the benefits of EU
membership. Starting a new front against hostile Western European views would put an
additional burden on the limited capacities of CEEC administrations.
3. Possibilities for Reconciliation
In the sections above I showed that the changes in the CEECs associated with the
accession process are in many ways in conflict with the pattern of the transformations
these countries went through in the early 1990s. Accession needs transformations different
from the earlier ones in a way that they will be less autonomous, need active government
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 The supportive behavior was not unambiguous even before that date, though. Back in 1994 Jim Rollo, a
prominent British scholar and civil servant noted that "...Austrian attitudes to CEE imports are not more and
perhaps less liberal than the sum of current EU members." (Rollo, 1995).
9control and reliance on bureaucracies, they will be centered more on Europe, would face
more resistance by particular Western countries or constituencies, and would need
cooperation with CEEC partners.
How much of a problem is this change in the pattern of transformation? First, we have to
see that, while the transition that started in 1989-1991 is a long and almost perpetual
process, it does have distinct phases. In 1997 several scholars have already emphasized
that the first phase of transformation, i.e. the period of systemic changes, is over or close to
being over (see, for instance, Andreff, 1997 and Kornai, 1997).9 There are new issues on
the transition agenda, such as the conditions and sources of growth, improvements in
technology and catching-up, the reform of the welfare system, and the enlargement of the
EU. The management of the next phase of transition does not necessarily have to be
similar to that applied in the previous phase.
Unless the countries have to face economic hardships for a protracted period of time, the
elites of the CEECs would probably understand and let the public accept that the next
reforms are less autonomous and more externally guided than the previous ones. Although
this is not easy to understand only a few years after regaining independence and self-
determination, these nations will probably learn the lesson that in the modern world, for
small nation states, there is only limited room of maneuver: the increasing interdependence
and the importance of economies of scale in research and development, distribution, and
marketing necessitates focusing on benefits of cooperation and integration, rather than
insisting on pursuing specific national strategies.10 It is also the tasks of the elites in the
CEECs to understand and propagate that EU membership does not mean only obedience,
but also new opportunities for co-decision in the Union. In addition, many of the future
reforms, including strictly EU-related ones, still leave a certain autonomy for the candidate
countries: let us hope that their governments will have sufficient imagination, expertise and
realism to find the fields where specific policies are possible, and solutions which fit best
to the needs of their countries.
It is important that the external guidance to the reforms in the CEECs is split among
different international institutions, and is not left solely to the EU. It is a benefit for the
three CEECs that have recently become OECD members that the introduction of full
convertibility of their currencies (including convertibility on the capital account), and
much of the liberalization of their banking regulations were carried out according to
OECD requirements, and have not been left to further stages of EU accession. For similar
considerations, the other candidates should aim at becoming OECD members as well as
WTO members before EU accession negotiations come to a decisive phase.
The transformation of the reform agenda into a planned and scheduled process in the
candidate countries is unavoidable, and the strict program of the institutionalized pre-
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Czech Republic and chief manager of the Czech transformation, according to which by 1994-1995 in his
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scholars, and the developments in 1997 in the Czech Republic showed that in this country, in fact, a great part
of the reforms had not even been started.
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 See Luif (1995) for the discussion of a similar learning process in Austria, Finland and Sweden, the three
countries that joined the EU most recently.
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accession negotiations and evaluations provide a good base for such a process. A special
problem in the candidate countries is how to keep EU-related reforms undisturbed by the
electoral cycle; this is an issue despite the fact that in most candidate countries all
meaningful political parties endorse EU membership. An example characterizing this
problem is the following: in 1996-1997, within essentially one year period, Poland had
three different persons (with different political lines) replacing each other in the position of
the state secretary coordinating EU-related policies, due to consecutive national elections.
These changes could have contributed to the disturbance between Brussels and Warsaw in
1998 which led to the loss of a Phare support  fund of ECU 34 million.
One of the most difficult tasks of accession will be the establishment of reliable,
professional bureaucracies (in the Weberian sense) to perform the tasks associated with
negotiations and EU-related administration. Given the immense ignorance concerning EU-
related issues in the CEECs, these bureaucracies will also have the task to educate
politicians, business, and the population. The success of this enterprise hinges not only on
sufficient financing and training (in which EU support will play a role), but also on the
ability of the nations to prevent the build-up of administrations that do not meet the
professional requirements, and/or misuse their power and are vulnerable to corruption. We
can only hope that the Accession Partnership will provide sufficient incentives and checks
to use efficiently the support of the EU earmarked for this purpose.
As for avoiding too much orientation toward Europe, the candidate countries have to
utilize all the vehicles of pending EU membership to establish close relations to the rest of
the world (if this looks beneficial), and also actively press for more openness of the Union
to developments outside the EU. If the CEECs value their existing special relations to
those countries that are left out of the Union for the time being (for example, Slovakia for
the Czech Republic, or neighboring countries with a high population of ethnic Hungarians
for Hungary), they have to negotiate about specific concessions from the EU to avoid
spoiling those relations with the accession.
While cooperation among candidate countries is not a must, it could be beneficial for them.
There is not much hope, however, that such cooperation will emerge, because in recent
years the accession process has developed more into a contest than into collaboration
among the applicants. Still, recently there have been some modest initiatives into the
direction of cooperation, both in official politics and in non-official circles.11
As for controlling the emerging hostile opinions and delaying maneuvers in certain EU
countries, different EU institutions would probably have a role: they should distribute the
necessary information and provide fora for discussions for those nations or constituencies
that feel threatened by the enlargement process.
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 Initiatives for such cooperation were discussed in Budapest by the prime ministers of the Czech Republic,
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